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ISSN 0869-5377
Author: Fink Eugen

Fink Eugen

German phenomenologist, Еdmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s disciple. A er the war, he became a professor at the University of Freiburg. A 20-volume edition of his writings is currently being prepared for publication.


The Problem of Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology / Logos. 2016. № 1 (110). P. 5-46
annotation:  In his seminal article from 1939, Fink presents his interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy by addressing the question of what the main problem of philosophy is. In his introduction, Fink stresses that at the start of any philosophy, including phenomenology, we find an astonishment that “reaches” and “overcomes” man and is experienced by him. The way a philosophy comes to grips with astonishment determines that philosophy’s characteristics and its main problem. The latter de defines the whole agenda and method of the philosophy. The problem of the Being is, for Husserl, the crucial problem in phenomenology, and he interprets it as a problem of evidence. Fink will follow a certain plan in his interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology, but the article develops only the first two items in his plan: being as a phenomenon and intentional analysis. Fink gives a specific interpretation of Husserl’s famous motto “to the things themselves:” according to Fink, this is a claim aiming to surpass habitual understandings and seeming clarity, and to find being in its given-ness. Only consciousness, under- stood in an intentional way, can o er access to being as to a phenomenon-giving-itself-by-itself. Intentional analysis is a method for researching consciousness, and it provides a way back to the beginnings of knowledge, i.e. to evidence. The latter is the genuine and immediate given-ness of being through vision. e aim of phenomenology is to come back from everyday evidence to the beginning through the constant questioning of mock-evidence.
Keywords:  Eugen Fink; Edmund Husserl; philosophical astonishment; evidence; intentional analysis
Critiquing Husserl: Elements / Logos. 2016. № 1 (110). P. 47-62
annotation:  In his work Critiquing Husserl: Elements, Eugen Fink reviews the main hurdles encountered by phenomenological research in philosophy. Among these hurdles he lists the interweaving between moments of description, analysis and speculation; the outer-philosophical presuppositions conicting with the claim of presuppositionlessness; the non-thought relation to the philosophical tradition; contradictions between the philosophical project and the practiced method; idols (or operative concepts) of phenomenological research, such as “immediate givenness,” “prepredicative experience,” “rigorous science,” “ultimate foundation.” Elements touched upon in this work include y-six aphorisms that are to serve as the foundation of a “Treatise on Phenomenological Research.” They mark a transition period in Fink’s thought (1939–1946). During this period he le behind collaboration (intellectual “symbiosis”) with Husserl (1928–1938), within the framework of which many original Finkian themes were developed (for example, ideas about the “meontic” nature of subjectivity, a speculative and constructive supplement to Husserl’s project), and moved towards his own project of philosophical cosmology (1947–1975). Of special interest is the fact that in 1940, Fink, while trying to overcome the limitations of phenomenological philosophy, began to rely not on his own philosophical project (which is yet to develop), but mainly on Heidegger’s (and sometimes also Hegel’s) critiques of Husserl. In this work, Fink is still engaged in the phenomenological project, yet he tries to move beyond the ideas of this tradition’s founding father. is stance explains the unexpected harshness of some of Fink’s formulations, such as “is not worth a dime philosophically,” “boring descriptions,” “flagrant presupposition of the phenomenological description,” etc. In addition, we should remember that this text is compiled from Fink’s private notes rather than from his speeches or published treatises.
Keywords:  phenomenology; critique; Eugen Fink; Edmund Husserl; presuppositionlessness; description; analysis; speculation
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